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Abstract
Th e aim of the paper is to analyze the media portrayal of the controversy stemming from 
president Barack Obama’s bow to Emperor Akihito during their meeting in Tokyo in November 
2009. Th e resulting controversy was quickly dubbed the “Bow-gate” and played itself out mostly 
in press commentary columns, blogs and political cable TV talk shows. Events like this oﬀ er 
an excellent opportunity to also see the intercultural dynamics and presuppositions existing 
between respective countries, as well as domestic political determinants shaping the perception 
of a presidency. A corpus of print and Internet media was selected examined in order to ﬁ nd 
and discuss the typial conceptual frames employed when debating the event.
Introduction
Th is paper will be an attempt to present some observations that can be drawn from 
the analysis of press and Internet discussions surrounding Barack Obama’s bow to
the Emperor Akihito during their formal meeting in Tokyo, on November 14th 2009. Th e
resulting controversy was quickly dubbed the “Bow-gate” and played itself out mostly in 
press commentary columns, blogs and political cable TV talk shows. While president’s 
visits and meetings abroad are usually analyzed in the context of foreign policy, events 
like this oﬀ er an excellent opportunity to also see the intercultural dynamics and 
presuppositions existing between respective countries, as well as domestic political 
determinants shaping the perception of a presidency. 
Th e paper will be divided in three parts. First, research questions will posed after 
a short introduction to the cultural dynamics in the U.S.-Japan relationship as the 
exempliﬁ cation of ideological presuppositions of the U.S. foreign policy. Th en,
the event in question will be recalled more closely and the corpus of texts analyzed as 
1 Th is paper is based in part on a conference presentation co-authored with Anna Trzaska.
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well as methods of analysis will be presented. Finally, conclusions will be formulated 
and discussed. 
Th e history of the U.S. – Japan relationship oﬀ ers many fascinating insights 
about interactions between culturally diﬀ erent states which share, at times at least, 
ambitions for global prominence. From the symbolic and actual “opening” of Japan, 
through ﬁ erce competition culminating in a brutal war, until the current long-lasting 
and stable alliance, the history of the relationship oﬀ ers a broad empirical material that 
could be used to analyze not only the mutual relations, but also the broader West-East 
interactions.
Cultural Background and Research Questions
Th e foundations for the current relations were laid after World War II, when 
victorious U.S. become a “sponsor” for Japan’s return to the international community 
as a model success of the capitalist camp. Racist portrayal of the Japanese during the 
war or controversies concerning the use of atomic weapons were generally brushed 
aside by what Igarashi called the “foundational narrative”2 explaining the common 
perceptions of the U.S.-Japanese relations. In that narrative, the atomic violence was 
the necessary shock the U.S. had to inﬂ ict on Japan to rescue it from its erroneous ways 
and help it realize the righteous longing for liberalism and democracy. Wartime images 
of the Japanese as ruthless and aggressive samurai3 were replaced by that of friendly 
and docile geisha,4 the new face of a country and its attractive traditionalism being 
integrated with modernization and development.
Th is can be viewed also as an exempliﬁ cation, in a sense, of typical orientalist 
pattern of Western nation civilizing an Asian nation, and was also ﬁ tting excellently 
with traditional American self-perception of champions of democracy and liberty.5 
A notable upset to this narrative happen in the mid 80s, when Japan began to be 
perceived, for awhile, as the main challenger of the U.S. global dominance. Strategically, 
Japan remained America’s “protégé,” continuing the post-war structure of an asymmetrical 
alliance. However, its amazing economic success was a cause for tension. While the 
U.S. still had get used to its, now chronic, foreign exchange deﬁ cit, Japan became
the world’s biggest creditor, had a huge surplus in trade exchange with the U.S. and 
2 Yoshikuni Igarashi,  Bodies of memory: Narratives of war in postwar Japanese culture, 1945–1970 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 20–34.
3 Seminal monograph on this subject is John Dower’s War without mercy. Race and power in the Paciﬁ c 
War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
4 See for example Naoko Shibusawa, America’s geisha ally: Reimagining the Japanese enemy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2006).
5 Igarashi, Bodies of memory, 35–28.
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began aggressively investing and purchasing on American soil.6 Economic policy of Japan 
started to be viewed by many as “predatory” and detrimental to the U.S. world standing. 
While the security alliance was faring fairly well, the U.S. had to throw its weight on the 
economic front, pressuring Japan to make some concessions on issues perceived to be 
unfair to American manufacturers, such as market access and currency manipulation. 
Th e fears of U.S. „passing” and the looming Japanese economic threat were often 
debated, some popular journalists and economists even advising the U.S. to accept 
some elements of the Japanese capitalism model, seen as superior. Previously repressed 
images of Japan as a threat resurfaced often, geisha being overshadowed by a reinvention 
of samurai – a “sarariman”,7 rank and ﬁ le corporate employee, insanely devoted and loyal 
to his company, which in turn was state-steered into an aggressive strategy of economic 
competition with the U.S. Main tenets of academically outdated anthropological 
descriptions of Japanese society, some dating to Ruth Benedict’s wartime studies, 
were continually used to reinforce the image of the Japanese as groupist, hierarchical, 
inscrutable.8 Th is easily translated into a deep uncertainty about the future: in a 1989 
poll more Americans were considering Japan as the greatest threat than there were 
those pointing to Soviet Union.9 
Th e Japanese economy went into a crisis in mid 90s and since then never truly 
picked up, and so the “threat” disappeared from the public’s interests. China gradually 
took over the role of potential challenger to America’s global position. Th e U.S.-
Japanese relations are nowadays rarely considered important news. Th e “bow-gate” 
oﬀ ers an opportunity to examine the current public perceptions of Japan in context of 
the dynamics sketched above. Th e symbolic meaning of the meeting of two leaders is 
especially important, as the postwar relationship of subdued Japan with its benevolent 
occupier is often exempliﬁ ed by the famous photograph of general Douglas MacArthur 
and Emperor Hirohito. Th e general, uniformed, tall and muscular, is posing next to 
much shorter and subdued Emperor, projecting the aura of decisiveness and strength. 
Second important angle from which the controversy can be analyzed is that of 
public perceptions surrounding Barack Obama’s presidency and foreign policy. Th e 
expectations Obama set for his presidency during the campaign were quite clear – 
new approach was to be based on developing soft or “smart” power and repairing the 
damage to the U.S. image wrought by the former president. Th is had to be reconciled 
with the traditional realist imperatives continually present in American strategy.10 Th at 
6 Michael J. Heale, “Anatomy of a scare: yellow peril politics in America, 1980–1993,” Journal of 
American Studies, 43 (2009): 19–47.
7 Japanese appropriation of the words “salaried man.” 
8 Steven S. Rosen, “Japan as other: Orientalism and cultural conﬂ ict,” Intercultural Communication 4 
(2000), http://www.immi.se/intercultural/nr4/rosen.htm (accessed August 28, 2010).
9 Susan D. Moeller, “Pictures of the enemy: Fifty years of images of Japan in the American press, 1941–
1992,” Journal of American Culture 19, no. 1 (1996): 37.
10 See for example Michael Green, David Twining, “Democracy and American grand strategy in Asia: 
Th e Realist principles behind an enduring idealism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International 
& Strate 30, no. 1 (2008).
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was especially pertinent to the Asia policy, where many perceived American position 
as eroding versus the assertive China.11 Obama faced a diﬃ  cult challenge then, as he 
would be “suspect” to conservative audience as a Democrat, traditionally perceived as 
weak and deferential. Th erefore, the controversy can inform us about the domestic 
political constraints imposed on the president’s public image.
Methods
Barack Obama’s 9 day trip to Asia in November 2009, his ﬁ rst while in oﬃ  ce, was rather 
intense, with visits to Japan, China, Korea, and a stopover in Singapore to attend the 
APEC (Asia-Paciﬁ c Economic Cooperation) summit in Singapore. Expectations were 
high, as they were everywhere Obama went during the ﬁ rst year of his term, especially 
that he was the ﬁ rst president of the USA who could claim some kind of Asian 
heritage. Th e list of issues with high priority was quite lengthy – negotiating economic, 
climate and security initiatives with APEC countries, discussing Iran sanctions and 
economic relations with China, or reaﬃ  rming alliances with two long time partners in 
East Asia – South Korea and Japan. Japan was the ﬁ rst country on the list to visit, and, 
while certainly not trivial, the issues that were to be discussed were not on top of the 
list of those to draw most of the international and domestic attention. Th at spot was of 
course reserved for the “rising” China.12 And yet the infamous “Obama bow” managed 
to become a somewhat of a highlight of the whole trip.
Obama was granted a lunch with the imperial couple, that is the Emperor Akihito 
and his wife Michiko, at the Imperial Palace. While walking up to greet them, he 
dived into a rather deep bow while, at the same time, oﬀ ering his handshake to the, 
apparently unfazed, emperor. 
It was all rather quick, lasting maybe a second. Th ere is no need for special expertise 
to know how customary bowing is in Japanese culture, as a sign of respect and civility. 
No exceptional amount of good will is also required to view this, however perhaps 
unusual, gesture as a sign of good will and an eagerness for politeness on the part of 
Obama. If some amount of awkwardness was present, it may have happened because 
of the signiﬁ cant height diﬀ erence between Obama and Akihito – instinctively not 
wanting to still be towering the emperor after completing the bow, Obama went lower 
than it was necessary. But if common sense and practical explanations were the only 
ones present, there wouldn’t be a suﬃ  cient reason for this paper.
11 See for example: Jan Yang, Rouben Azizian, “China-US Tensions: New Era or Old Pattern?,” Zealand 
International Review 35, no. 6 (2010): 16.
12 See for example: Michael D. Swaine, “Perceptions of an assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor 32 
(2000): 1–19; Li Zhang, “Th e rise of China: media perception and implications for international politics,” 
Journal of Contemporary China 64, no. 19 (2010): 233–254.
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Th at brief episode was the beginning of what was later to be often referred to as the 
“Bow-gate.” Th e picture of Obama bent in front of the imperial couple13 was picked up 
immediately by the media and, more importantly, appeared on hundreds of blog posts, 
naturally mostly on those critical of Obama. After this initial phase the debate about 
the issue entered a stage of mutually stimulated “buzz”, in which the blogs reacted not 
only to the event itself but to the media portrayal of thereof, and the media started 
to follow up the event by relating to what was being said within the blogosphere. 
Politico was at front of the debate, publishing the photo and scoring a widely quoted 
comment from Obama staﬀ er, who maintained that nothing inappropriate took place 
and that “I think that those who try to politicize those things are just way, way, way oﬀ  
base (…) He observes protocol (…) he enhanced both the position and the status 
of the U.S., relative to Japan.”14 L.A. Times blog titled its feature on the event “How 
Low Can He Go”, posting updates on major new developments in the debate, such 
as linking to YouTube montages of other instances of Obama’s bows when meeting 
foreign leaders.15 Th e initiative belonged to conservative media where, unsurprisingly, 
the gesture was seen as inappropriate, to say the least. Interestingly, Fox News channel 
even conducted a poll to examine the public reception of the controversy, which was 
probably closest anyone has gotten to relate the debate to actual public sentiment. 
Th e results were not good for the conservatives, since only 28 percent answered that the 
gesture was inappropriate.16
Th e corpus of texts selected to explore the research questions outlined above 
consisted of traditional press articles as well as political blogs, dating from November 
14th 2009 onward. Ten newspapers and magazines were selected based on largest 
daily circulation in 2009.17 Blogs were selected by cross referencing the two widely 
recognized blog ranking systems of Technocrati and Wikio websites18 – blogs 
appearing in respective rankings top tens were taken under consideration. Th e search 
was performed online19 and at the EBSCO’s Newspaper Source database,20 using 
appropriate keywords (such as “bow”, “Akihito”, etc.). Appendix contains the list of the 
34 sources used. 
13 See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/17/obama-bowing-japanese-empe-
ror (accessed February 10, 2010). 
14 Mike Allen, “Barack Obama bowed to Japanese emperor as ‘protocol.’” Politico. http://www.politico.
com/news/stories/1109/2961.htm (accessed February 10, 2010).
15 Andrew Malcolm, “How low will he go? Obama gives Japan’s Emperor Akihito a wow bow.” Top of 
the Hat, http://www.latimesblogs.latimes.com/Washinaton/2009/11obama-emperor-akihito-japan.html.
16 Clarence Page, “President’s sense of timing lacks drama.” Chicago Tribune 29 (accessed November 
2009: 1.39)
17 http://www.burrellesluce.com/top100/2009_Top_100List.pdf (accessed February 10, 2011).
18 http://techpresident.com/blog-entry/top-us-politics-blogs-technoratis-update; http://American po-
werblog.blogspot.com/2009/06/bloggers-whos-who-wikios-top-100.html (accessed February 10, 2011). 
19 Using Google as well as particular blogs’ own search functionality. 
20 http://www.ebscohost.com/academic/newspaper-source (accessed February 10, 2011)
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Th e electronic medium of blogs was chosen since the debate was, in signiﬁ cant 
degree, stimulated by the political blogs circuit, with the typical constant recycling 
of news by adding updates, back-and-forth arguments being carried on sometimes 
hourly basis or referencing and quoting other blogs or news outlets. Th e signiﬁ cance of 
blogs in American political debates has been widely noted in recent years.21 
Content analysis and discourse analysis establish the methodological background 
for examining of the corpus. From the host of analytical tools used in those methods, for
purposes of this paper the conceptual frame analysis was employed. Th e concept of 
a frame, originally introduced by Erving Goﬀ man and since then much transformed, is 
an attempt to deﬁ ne an ontological structure of reality explicitly or implicitly introduced 
by text producers.22 Luther and Miller deﬁ ned constructing frames as “simplifying, 
highlighting and making more salient some aspects of reality while obscuring other.”23 
Th at understanding of a frame is closely related to the discourse-analytic concept 
of a macroproposition of a text, that is the fundamental sense expressed by the text, 
transcending any explicitly stated propositions and requiring readers’ knowledge of 
given cultural context.24 Of the possible approaches to frame analysis, the less formal 
method of close reading without pre-constructed models or quantitative analysis 
was chosen, due to the exploratory nature of research questions posed and length 
constraints. Koring and Matthes deﬁ ned labeled this approach “hermeneutical”.25 
Th e typical text characteristics distinguished by critical discourse analysis, such as 
keywords, modality or rhetorical techniques, will also be pointed out and treated
as building blocks of frames.26 
Th e common denominator for the research questions outlined is that of self-
perceptions. Th e cultural dimension of U.S. Japanese relationship or public perceptions 
of president’s gestures are in fact providing us with an insight to American self-image 
and its structure. Episodes of controversy can serve as Chilton’s “critical moments of 
discourse”,27 revealing the media portrayal’s cultural determinants.
21 Norman H. Nie et. al., “Th e world wide web and the U.S. political news market,” American Journal of 
Political Science, 54, no. 2 (2010): 428–439.
22 See Robert M. Entman „Framing: Toward a clariﬁ cation of a fractured paradigm,” Journal
of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 51–58.
23 Catherine Luther, Marc M. Miller, “Framing of the 2003 U.S. – Iraq war demonstrations,” Journalism 
and Mass Communications Quarterly, 85, no. 1 (2005): 79.
24 Teun van Dijk, ”Th e interdisciplinary study of news as discourse,” in A handbook of qualitative 
methodologies for mass communication research, ed. K.B. Jensen, N.W. Jankowski (London: Routledge, 1991): 
112–113.
25  Kohring, Jorg Matthes, “Th e content analysis of media frames: toward improving reliability and 
validity,” Journal of Communication 58, no. 2 (2008): 258–279.
26 Gerlinde Mautner, “Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media,” in Qualitative 
Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. M. Krzyzanowski, R. Wodak (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 
2008).
27 Quoted in William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “Media discourse and public opinion on 
nuclear power: A constructionist approach,” Th e American Journal of Sociology 95, no. 1 (1989): 1–37.
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Results and Discussion
Th e event could be read and understood in a number of ways, since its circumstances 
encompassed diﬀ erent layers of context. Th e place of the event, a palace of the Japanese 
Imperial couple, potentially situated it the in the context of the U.S.-Japanese relations, 
which are founded on a rather remarkable transition from sworn enemies during the 
WWII to long lasting allies after that. Th e occasion, Obama’s ﬁ rst East Asian visit, 
evoked the expectations developed at the front of the national foreign policy. Finally, 
the type of the event, which could be described as a diplomatic mishap or a gaﬀ e, places 
it a very speciﬁ c realm of diplomatic language and symbolism. Here especially, one can 
easily see how diﬀ erent systems of meaning or etiquette were overlapping: we have the
U.S. diplomatic protocol, Japanese custom of bowing (as understood by Obama),
the speciﬁ c protocol applicable exclusively to the imperial couple (which some say is 
obscure even to average Japanese themselves) and ﬁ nally the perspective of the American 
audiences with their Western understanding of the gesture. All this combined created 
the “murky waters” of diplomatic protocol, as one of the commentators put it, and 
murky waters are perfect for political debates since no clear answers are available. 
First observation that can be drawn after examining texts dealing with the 
controversy is that traditional press and blogs focused on diﬀ erent aspects of those 
outlined above. Newspapers rarely focused exclusively on the event, more often using 
it to make larger points when reviewing the whole trip or its reception. Obama’s 
bow was a symbol of either good willed cultural sensitivity28 or his underwhelming 
performance during the excursion.29 Th e blogs, in accordance with their ﬂ exibility 
and capacity for immediate communication, grappled with the event more directly. 
It is interesting to observe how political blogs and websites become important actors 
of the media landscape,30 reaching out to wide range sources (Politico), and more 
importantly, providing the momentum for the issue. By the time newspapers published 
their take on the matter, most of the rhetorical salvoes on both sides had been ﬁ red, 
and summarizing the controversy was often the only thing left to do. 
What newspapers and blogs shared was the strategies to determine their stance 
onwards Obama’s gesture. Th e most popular way was trying to recall historical 
examples of similar controversies. Obama’s supporters often mentioned bows given to 
Emperor Hirohito by President Nixon and George Bush’s bow at Hirohito’s funeral. 
Th ere was also 1994 Bill Clinton’s bow to Akihito, then gently criticized by the New 
York Times, which was now cited as proof of media uncritical support for Obama. 
Critics were pointing out to Obama’s bow to Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah earlier that 
28 “Obama goes to China, brings home a T-shirt,” USA Today, 20 Nov 2009: A. 10.
29 Peggy Noonan,  “Declarations: He can’t take another bow,” Wall Street Journal,  28 Nov 2009:
A. 15.
30 Nie et.al. “Th e world wide web and the U.S. political news market”…, 428.
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year as further proof of President’s lasting problem with meeting aristocrats.31 Linking 
to a YouTube compilation of foreign leaders meeting the Emperor with a simple 
handshake was also popular.32 Reaching out to experts was, perhaps surprisingly, 
less frequent. Newsweek included two counterbalancing opinions of former State 
Department experts on diplomatic protocol and NewsBusters blog quoted an 
anonymous expert after another blog. No deﬁ nitive answer as to whether bowing 
is allowed or proper under the protocol was presented, experts did, however, agree 
that combining a bow and a handshake was wrong. More often, the authors quoted 
either presidential staﬀ ers or opposition politicians (Dick Cheney, Karl Rove). Even 
a 1994 New York Times article, asserting that bowing is traditionally implicitly banned 
from the protocol, was quoted to prove the inappropriateness of the situation. Th at 
no Japanese sources were employed is not that surprising, having in mind the Western 
media long established ethnocentrism – foreign cultures are still most often explored 
and explained by Western “experts” on them rather than a direct communication with 
their representative.33 
Close reading texts in order to deﬁ ne the frames employed most often to 
communicate the event brought two main conclusions. First was the unexpected lack 
of importance of the U.S. – Japanese relations context. Of all the texts only 6 explicitly 
related to the history of mutual relations. Th e most popular reference was reminding 
that Akihito’s father approved the attack on Pearl Harbor. Only two texts tried to 
elaborate and make a larger point about the mutual relations. LA Times blog Andrew 
Malcolm wrote a short synopsis of the relationship,34 which informed readers about the 
main historical events of thereof. It seemed rather hastily put together, with the only 
relevant point being the comparison of Obama’s bow to the iconic picture portraying 
general MacArthur standing next to Emperor Hirohito.35 Conservative Powerline used 
the same juxtaposition being much less subtle about its meaning: “When MacArthur 
stood beside the Emperor, he subordinated himself to his country. MacArthur not 
only believed in the proposition that all men are created equal, he sought to teach it to 
others. Japan was a case in point.”36 
Th is reaction is a clear sign of power-balance perception forming the foundational 
narrative of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Th e U.S. is the “teacher” of democratic 
values, and Obama’s gesture was a clear denial of that mission. It also interesting to note 
that of all texts relating to the history of mutual relations, all referred to the WWII 
and none to the period of tensions during the 80s mentioned before, or any post-war 
moment for that matter. Th is indicates the strength of memories of war in American 
31 Scott Johnson, “Why is this man bowing?” Powerline, http://www.powerline.com/archieves/
2009/11/024948.php (accessed February 10, 2010).
32 Malcolm, “Obama’s wow bow II: Turns out Japan’s emperor is just ﬁ ne with simple handshakes”… 
33 Luther, Press Images, National Identity and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of U.S.-Japan Relation from 
1955–1995 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 15.
34 Malcolm, “How low will he go? Obama gives Japan’s Emperor Akihito a wow bow”… 
35 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Macarthur_hirohito.jpg (accessed February 10, 2010).
36 Johnson, “Why is this man bowing?”…
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collective memory: if the historical context is ever evoked it dates back directly to the 
events of the war, still deﬁ ning the basic understanding of Japan as a former enemy. 
Th at deﬁ nition overshadows 65 years of the successful alliance. Naturally, what is most 
important is that the majority of texts didn’t mention the historical context at all. Th is 
strongly indicates that Japan, while remaining a vital ally for policymakers and experts, 
has almost disappeared from the public “radar” when it comes to regional politics.
In the lengthier analysis of Obama’s visit, the issues dealt with during his stopover in 
Tokyo were usually given only secondary importance. 
But even if the U.S.-Japanese conﬂ ict frame was not employed as often as it probably 
would have been two decades earlier, the most popular frame used was based on 
similar premises, only on a more universal level. Comments of Obama’s bow situated 
the event squarely in the context of the U.S. position abroad. For the critics the bow 
was unnecessary and detrimental to U.S. image and interests. Even media supportive 
of Obama rarely treated the gesture as something to be proud of, instead diminishing 
its importance or seeing it as a good willed blunder. In all, of the of the 34 pieces read 
more than half have been critical of Obama’s gesture and/or his handling of the visits. 
Th e most common criticism was informed by the classical American republicanism 
– American leaders or citizens should not grovel before royalty (“groveling” was 
a keyword appearing often). Th at Jeﬀ ersonian reverence for individual freedom has 
not been historically unchallenged, competing with the proponents of a strong state 
since the days of Hamiltonian federalists. Indeed, rhetorical positioning of Obama as 
the representative of individual freedoms and equality may seem somewhat peculiar, 
given the relative amount of authority of his position, if not the U.S. global hegemony. 
Yet that tension is easily neutralized when subsumed by the overreaching frame of 
American exceptionalism.37 
Th is potent metanarrative has been present in American imagination since the 
puritan idea of the “city on the hill.” Th e opposition between the state and individual 
is resolved by integrating two “master frames”38 of liberal individualism and ethnic 
nationalism. While the ﬁ rst stresses the ontological status of rational and free 
individual, the second ascribes that agency to the nation, seen as a primordial group-
entity. Americans are free and self-reliant individuals, and their state is founded on the 
ideals of allowing them to maintain being that. Th at intertwining of those two themes 
is common for many modern democracies, but the American version has additional 
element of a strong sense of self-assured uniqueness and self-proclaimed mission to 
spread those ideals. Both critics and supporters of Obama’s gesture embrace similar 
fundamental assumptions. Whether decrying Obama’s behavior as embarrassing and 
deferential or simply portraying it as one of the indications of the trip’s failures, they 
37 See, for example: David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics 
of Identity, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Godfrey Hodson, Th e Myth of 
American Exceptionalism (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2009).
38 Th omas Konig, “Frames: Th eoretical Preliminaries,” Economic and Social Research Council Research 
Methods Programme, http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/methods/publications (accessed February 1, 2011).
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view the trip as a set of world-problems to be tackled by the president – that capacity 
and responsibility is viewed as something natural. 
Obama’s bow could easily be interpreted as a powerful disruption to that 
metanarrative, viewed as his deference and subservience to external authority – 
authority based on tradition, blood, and established hierarchy. Th ese are discursively 
opposite to American ideals, and are actually used as features of “Others” Americans 
deﬁ ne themselves against. European monarchies of the “Old World”, Soviet 
totalitarianism, Japanese hierarchical “groupism” and now Chinese authoritarianism 
were clear opposites of ideals of freedom and equality, as well as were challenging 
American superiority.39 Th e construction of Other is necessary for self-deﬁ nition. Th is 
is clearly present in the following quote from the typical criticism wielded at Obama:
Obama’s breach of protocol is of a piece with the substance of his foreign policy. He means 
to teach Americans to bow before monarchs and tyrants. He embodies the ideological 
multiculturalism that sets the United States on the same plane as other regimes based on 
tribal privilege and royal bloodlines. He gives expressive form to the idea that the United 
States now willingly prostrates itself before the rest of the world. He declares that the 
United States is a country like any other, only worse, because we have so much for which 
to apologize.40
To conclude, it is worth stressing the political potential of symbolic events like 
this, especially when summarized with a quickly spreading image. In hindsight, it is 
easy to see its iconic potential, as it came dangerously close to the status held, for 
example, by the photo of President Ford tumbling from the stairs of the presidential 
jet. Controversies like this demonstrate the limits to expectations of foreign policy 
change associated with Obama. Promises of more conciliatory and image-friendly 
approach easily scored points with voters tired of former president policy. But the idea 
of America’s need for leadership and prominence is deeply ingrained, and upsetting it, 
even unwillingly, can be politically dangerous. 
APPENDIX
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“Blow-up over bow,” Newsday, 17 Nov 2009: A. 58.
“Leaving more questions than he takes,” Th e Washington Post, 19 Nov 2009: A. 2.
39 Chengxin Pan, “Th e‘ China Th reat’ in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other 
as power politics,” Alternatives: global, local, political 29, no. 3 ( June 2004): 313. 
40 Johnson, “Why is this man bowing?”…
41 All sources last accessed February 10, 2010.
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